IGSNRR OpenIR
Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control
Chang, Dunhu1; Gao, Donghui1; Xu, Xiangbo2,3; Wang, Xin4; Ju, Ying1; Shen, Xiaoyue5
2021-02-08
Source PublicationENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH
ISSN0944-1344
Pages13
Corresponding AuthorXu, Xiangbo(ydxu.ccap@igsnrr.ac.cn)
AbstractPollution control policies have achieved remarkable results in China. However, industrial firms still lack enthusiasm for technological innovation to reduce pollution and endogenous motivation for controlling pollution, which pose severe obstacles to industrial pollution control. The top-runner scheme can stimulate the pollution control behaviors of firms to a certain extent. Therefore, the top-runner scheme is combined with economic incentive policies to design an appropriate incentive scheme in this paper, theoretical research is conducted on the selection standards and incentive methods, and four industries mainly responsible for pollution in a developed province of China are investigated as case studies. The results show that (1) the selection standard that stipulates the rewarded quotas instead of the discharge amount achieved higher emission reduction efficiency; (2) tax cuts are the best incentive for top-runners, and (3) the top-runner incentive scheme achieves a greater reduction effect in high-pollution industries than low-pollution industries. Value-added tax exemption for the top-runner, as determined by the rewarded quotas, contributes to increasing the enthusiasm from firms to participate in and improve pollution control measures.
KeywordTop-runner Pollution control Environmental performance Economic incentive policy Selection standard Incentive method
DOI10.1007/s11356-021-12561-1
Indexed BySCI
Language英语
Funding ProjectFundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ; Research Funds of Renmin University of China[17XNB025]
Funding OrganizationFundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities ; Research Funds of Renmin University of China
WOS Research AreaEnvironmental Sciences & Ecology
WOS SubjectEnvironmental Sciences
WOS IDWOS:000616157600004
PublisherSPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Citation statistics
Document Type期刊论文
Identifierhttp://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/160668
Collection中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所
Corresponding AuthorXu, Xiangbo
Affiliation1.Renmin Univ China, Sch Environm & Nat Resources, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
2.Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Geog Sci & Nat Resources Res, Key Lab Ecosyst Network Observat & Modeling, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
3.United Nations Environm Programme, Int Ecosyst Management Partnership, Beijing 100101, Peoples R China
4.Minist Ecol & Environm, China Natl Environm Monitoring Ctr, Beijing 100012, Peoples R China
5.Minist Ecol & Environm, Policy Res Ctr Environm & Econ, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
Recommended Citation
GB/T 7714
Chang, Dunhu,Gao, Donghui,Xu, Xiangbo,et al. Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control[J]. ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH,2021:13.
APA Chang, Dunhu,Gao, Donghui,Xu, Xiangbo,Wang, Xin,Ju, Ying,&Shen, Xiaoyue.(2021).Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control.ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH,13.
MLA Chang, Dunhu,et al."Top-runner incentive scheme in China: a theoretical and empirical study for industrial pollution control".ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND POLLUTION RESEARCH (2021):13.
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Related Services
Recommend this item
Bookmark
Usage statistics
Export to Endnote
Google Scholar
Similar articles in Google Scholar
[Chang, Dunhu]'s Articles
[Gao, Donghui]'s Articles
[Xu, Xiangbo]'s Articles
Baidu academic
Similar articles in Baidu academic
[Chang, Dunhu]'s Articles
[Gao, Donghui]'s Articles
[Xu, Xiangbo]'s Articles
Bing Scholar
Similar articles in Bing Scholar
[Chang, Dunhu]'s Articles
[Gao, Donghui]'s Articles
[Xu, Xiangbo]'s Articles
Terms of Use
No data!
Social Bookmark/Share
All comments (0)
No comment.
 

Items in the repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.